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SAVING MICKEY MOUSE: THE UPCOMING FIGHT FOR COPYRIGHT TERM
EXTENSION IN 2018
Kaitlyn Bernaski
Seton Hall University School of Law
Abstract
This article argues that copyright terms should be extended again in 2018, when the
current copyright statute calls for some copyrighted works of film, music, and literature to start
entering the public domain, and when Congress is to decide on the future of copyright term
extension. Term extension has been a hot topic among copyright owners for years, and lobbying
efforts by copyright owners have pushed terms to be extended in 1831, 1909, 1976, and in 1998.
Proponents of extension argue that additional protection incentivizes copyright owners to
restore older works, disseminate them to the public, and continue to create new works. A fear
exists that works in the public domain will be tarnished and exploited. Those who argue against
copyright term extension claim that current copyright protection is more than sufficient to
protect copyright’s purpose of encouraging creativity and unfairly grants the author a
monopoly on his copyright for an extensive amount of time.
This article explores the copyright extension battle, particularly through the involvement
of the Disney Corporation, a major proponent and lobbyist of copyright extension through the
years. It reviews related Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate the procedural history of
copyright term extension. This article traces Disney’s participation in the successful fight to
extend copyrights, as well as the expected lobbying efforts of copyright owners as 2018
approaches. It also analyzes the arguments for extension and for copyright reform, and what
either decision would mean for copyright owners, focusing on the effect changes would have on
large-quantity copyright holders such as Disney. Finally, the article concludes that Congress
should grant copyright extension in 2018 by taking various measures, and particularly for
copyrights that are still in use by their respective authors.
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1998, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) was signed
into law, granting copyright owners extended copyright terms in various ways for older works,
new works, and works of corporate authorship.1 One noteworthy provision included increasing
the duration of copyright protection for works published before January 1, 1978 for an additional
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Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 226 (2003)

of 1998).

(explaining the passage of the Copyright Extension Act

twenty years.2 This meant that copyright owners of older works would have copyright protection
until 2018, when Congress will inevitably face a similar debate of whether terms should be
extended again.3 The Disney Corporation was heavily involved as a proponent of term
extension, as Mickey Mouse and some of Disney’s other prominent copyrights would have
entered the public domain without passage of the 1998 Act.4 As 2018 draws closer, the battle for
copyright term extension is expected to reignite, and term extension should be granted again, as
copyright owners should reap the benefits of their contributions to society, and future works
continuously need to be incentivized.
This article explores the long-debated issue of copyright term extension, and why
copyright terms should be altered and extended. Part II examines the long history of the
copyright term extension battle. The change in copyright terms over the years will be discussed,
from the Copyright Act of 1790, Copyright Act of 1831, Copyright Act of 1909, and Copyright
Act of 1976, along with more recent modifications to copyright terms.
In 1998, Disney faced the loss of their arguably most-famous copyright, Mickey Mouse,
and thus began their participation as one of the prominent lobbyists for copyright term
extension.5 Part III examines Disney’s involvement in the most recent fight for extended
copyright terms. In 2018, Disney, and many other copyright owners, will face the same problem
and will most likely lobby extensively for another term extension.6 Disney should undoubtedly
push for another law along the lines of CTEA to further the duration of their copyright terms.
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Id.
Laurie Richter, Reproductive Freedom: Striking A Fair Balance Between Copyright and Other Intellectual
Property Protections in Cartoon Characters, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 441, 451 (2009) (“In just two (2) years, Disney
spent more than $6.3 million on the cause, and it appears to have paid off since the result was the creation of the
CTEA.”).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 383 (2000) (“Due
to the enactment of the CTEA, no new works will fall into the public domain until the year 2018.”)
3
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Part IV examines the Act in detail, starting with its introduction in the Senate on March
20, 1997.7 Those in favor of the bill argued that term extension was necessary due to increased
human life expectancy, longer copyright terms in Europe that the United States needed to match
to simplify the international entertainment industry, and to encourage the creation of works that
would otherwise not be produced under the existing limited copyright terms.8 Opponents argued
that term extensions were not necessary to promote the progress of science and the useful arts
and that most works receive the majority of the profits that they will make within the first few
years of creation.9 Despite this opposition, the Act passed the Senate and the House on October
7, 1998, and was signed into law by President Clinton on October 27, 1998.10
Following the passage of the Act in 1998, the opponents to copyright extension continued
their fight, all the way to the United States Supreme Court.11 Part V examines the case of Eldred
v. Ashcroft, in which the Court decided upon a challenge to the Act based on constitutional
grounds. The challenge was based on the argument that the Constitution’s Copyright Clause
gives Congress the power to promote the progress of science and useful arts by granting
copyrights for limited times.12 The Court sided with the proponents of term extension, holding
that the twenty-year term extension did not violate the Copyright Clause, mostly based on the
interpretation that the Clause intended Congress to set a limit for copyright terms – but no
constitutional restriction exists for how long that limit can be.13
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S. 505 (105th): Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 105 th Congress, 1997-1998.
Yemi Adeyanju, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act: A Violation of Progress and Promotion of the
Arts, 2003 SYRACUSE L. & TECH. J. 3. (2003).
9
Id.
10
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
11
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
12
Id. at 186.
13
Id. at 189. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.8
8
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While the copyright term extension battle has been silenced for a number of years, as
2018 grows closer, the arguments for and against further term extension will inevitably begin
again. Part VI will analyze the benefits of copyright term extension and the argument for further
extension, as well as the pitfalls of term extension, and explain why terms should be altered and
extended again in 2018. Copyright terms should be extended for a number of reasons in 2018,
including the fact that people are living longer and should be able to enjoy the fruits of their
labor, companies are existing longer, and there is more of a possibility now than ever before for
inferior copies of copyrighted works to be made and distributed with modern technology.
Part VII suggests how copyright terms should be extended and altered to further protect
authors of copyrighted works. While creators currently receive a certain amount and duration of
protection, many copyrighted works that would potentially enter the public domain soon are still
used by the companies or authors who created them, and for a large profit. In modern times,
where companies, as well as people, are enduring longer and there is more access and
dissemination of works, there is a serious need for copyright protection – and for it to be a
lengthy protection. The Supreme Court has already held that the Constitution does not state what
limit must be placed on copyrights, but just that there needs to be a limit of some sort.14 By
taking certain measures, Congress can ensure that copyright owners and the public receive the
best result.
Part VIII concludes, summarizing the evolution of the copyright term extension battle
and the likely future of it, and how copyright protection should be expanded to further the goals
of copyright law.
II. HISTORY OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION BATTLE
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The Copyright Term extension battle has waged for years, with copyright statutes
changing multiple times, always extending terms. The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first
statute that provided for specific copyright terms.15 In 1831, the first general revision to the Act
of 1790 was enacted, extending copyright terms.16 Decades later, the Copyright Act of 1909
amended and consolidated previous copyright statutes.17 Lastly, the current statute is the
Copyright Act of 1976, which was later amended by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
the Copyright Term Extension Act.18 Through the years, copyright terms have been altered as an
ever-changing part of our laws.
The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first copyright statute in the United States.19 The Act
provided a copyright term lasting fourteen years from the date of publication.20 That term was
then renewable for an additional fourteen years, but only if the work’s author survived the first
term.21 This renewable term applied to works that were already published, works that had been
created but were not published, and future works, and certain formality requirements were
created for copyrights.22 This Act marked the first time that works would be protected under
copyright.
In 1831, the Copyright Act was amended for the first time.23 The original copyright term
was extended from fourteen years to twenty eight years from the date of publication, with an
option to renew the copyright for another fourteen years.24 Also, musical compositions became
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See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790 Act).
See Act of Feb. 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
17
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
18
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
19
See 1 Stat. 124.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See Act of Feb. 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
24
Victoria A. Grzelak, Mickey Mouse & Sonny Bono Go to Court: The Copyright Term Extension Act and Its Effect
on Current and Future Rights, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 99 (2002) (discussing the 1831 Act).
16
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statutorily protected works.25 Furthermore, the statute of limitations on copyright actions was
increased from one to two years, and formality requirements were altered.26 The Copyright Act
of 1831 marked the first of a handful of amendments to the Act.
The next major revision of the Copyright Act occurred in 1909.27 Copyright terms were
maintained at twenty-eight years from publication, but the renewable term of protection was
extended from fourteen years to twenty-eight years.28 This Act also created two systems of
copyright protection.29 State laws protect unpublished works, and original, published works with
a notice of copyright affixed would be protected under federal copyright law.30 If a published
work did not have a notice of copyright affixed, the work would not be protected and would
enter the public domain.31 The public domain contains the “facts, ideas, and concepts which
cannot be protected by copyright.”32 These changes in 1909 created a growing evolvement of
copyright law.
The Copyright Act was next amended in 1976, and this version, with some slight
changes, remains in effect today.33 Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection
extends to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”34 Works of authorship include literary
works, musical works (and accompanying words), dramatic works (and accompanying music),
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures
25

1 Patry on Copyright § 1:23 (discussing the 1831 Act).
Id.
27
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (Mar. 4, 1909; repealed Jan. 1, 1978).
28
1 Patry on Copyright § 1:45 (detailing the 1909 Act).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
17 U.S.C. § 107(b) (2007).
33
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
34
Id.
26
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and other audiovisual works, and sound recordings.35 Copyright holders are granted five
exclusive rights: the right to reproduce their work, to create derivative works, to distribute copies
by sale, lease, or rental, to perform the work publicly, and to display the work publicly.36 Under
this amendment, the fair use defense to copyright was codified for the first time.37 Copyrighted
works are permitted to be used for criticism, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research
purposes, and other purposes.38 Very importantly, this Act increased the copyright term to the
life of the author plus fifty years after the author’s death.39 Anonymous works, pseudonymous
works, and works made for hire enjoy seventy-five years of protection.40 For works published
before 1978 that had not entered the public domain already, seventy-five years of protection was
also granted.41 Also, the requirements of registration, deposit, and renewing to maintain
copyright were abolished.42 This version of the Act prevails today, with some changes made to it
by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Copyright Term Extension Act.43
In 1998, Congress extended the duration of copyright protection by twenty years. 44
Therefore, most copyrights now last from creation until seventy years after the author’s death. 45
Works created between 1923 and 1978 enjoy ninety-five years of copyright protection.46 The
extended term applies to existing and future copyrights.47 This current copyright term extension
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Id.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
37
17 U.S.C. § 107.
38
Id.
39
17 U.S.C. § 302.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law (6th ed. 2003), 22-27.
43
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
44
17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
45
Id.
46
17 U.S.C. §§302-304 (2011).
47
Id.at 770-771.
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therefore is set to expire in 2018, when Congress will be faced with the same decision again of
whether to extend copyright terms further.48
III. DISNEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE
Historically, the Disney Corporation has been extremely protective of their copyrights
and has been a prominent proponent of copyright term extension. The company has gone so far
previously as to sue three Florida day care centers that each featured a painting of Mickey Mouse
as part of their indoor décor.49 Disney also threatened to sue when the 1989 Oscar awards
featured a parody of Snow White movie in the opening number of the broadcast.50 Therefore, it
was not surprising when Disney was heavily involved in the fight for copyright term extension in
the late 1990s.
Disney became involved in the term extension battle because the company faced the
possibility of losing protection for an integral part of their intellectual property, their Mickey
Mouse character. Mickey Mouse was created by Walt Disney in 1928, and appeared in three
feature films that year.51 Mickey Mouse has served as the ultimate symbol of Disney, and by the
time copyright term extension was debated in 1998, the copyright on Mickey Mouse earned
about $8 billion per year between Disney’s consumer products and theme parks.52 With the
whopping revenue that Mickey Mouse brings in for Disney annually, Disney was naturally
strongly invested in the extension of copyright terms.
Disney took major steps to lobby for copyright term extension in 1998. Michael Eisner,
the chairman of Disney in 1998, personally met with Trent Lott, the Senate Majority Leader at
48

Richter, supra note 3, at 451.
Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. &
SPORTS L. REV. 429 (Spring 1994).
50
Id. at 435.
51
Douglas A. Hedenkamp, Free Mickey Mouse: Copyright Notice, Derivative Works, and the Copyright Act of
1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254, 255 (Spring 2003).
52
Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 292 (2002).
49
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that time to discuss the situation.53 Disney created a Disney Political Action Committee that
heavily donated to the senator’s campaign chests.54 After Lott became a co-sponsor of CTEA,
Disney donated to his campaign, and contributed to eighteen of the bill’s sponsors in both
Houses.55 It is estimated that Disney contributed more than $800,000 to the reelection
campaigns of these sponsors of CTEA.56 Disney’s major moves towards copyright extension
were successful, as CTEA was signed into law.
IV. THE 1998 SONNY BONO COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT
On October 27, 1998, President Bill Clinton signed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 into law.57 Due to CTEA, no published copyrighted work will enter the
public domain until January 1, 2019.58 CTEA brought numerous changes to the copyright law in
existence at the time of CTEA’s passage. Under the CTEA, works created after January 1, 1978
receive copyright protection for the life of the author plus seventy years.59 For anonymous
works, pseudonymous works and “works made for hire,” ninety-five years of protection would
be enjoyed from first publication, or one hundred and twenty years of protection from creation.60
For works that were already in their renewal term at the time the Act became effective, copyright
protection was altered to include ninety-five years of protection from the date the copyright was
originally secured.61

53

Id.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Lindsay Warren Bowen, Jr., Givings and the Next Copyright Deferment, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 824 (2008).
57
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 364 (2000).
58
Id.
59
17 U.S.C. §302(a) (2003).
60
Patrick H. Haggerty, The Constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 70 U. CIN.
REV. 651, 659 (2002).
61
Id.
54
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Proponents for CTEA argued that a longer copyright term creates a greater incentive for
authors to create more works.62 Since granting an author a limited monopoly creates incentive
for authors to produce works, extending that monopoly would further incentivize creativity and
the production of original works.63 Making the process more appealing and rewarding for
authors can only help stimulate new, original works, which undoubtedly benefits the public who
gets the opportunity to enjoy and experience these works.
Further, proponents of the CTEA purport that copyright terms should be long enough to
not only benefit the author, but for future heirs of the author.64 With modern times has come
expanded life expectancies and expanded commercial longevity of works.65 Advocates have
purported that terms should be long enough to protect the author and two succeeding generations
of heirs. The lobbying efforts of companies like Disney paid off, as the Act was enacted.
V. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION OF ELDRED V. ASHCROFT
Eric Eldred, a retired programmer and founder of an online press, served as the plaintiff
for the constitutional challenge to the CTEA.66 Eldred’s “Eldritch Press” was an international
electronic library that made public domain books available on the internet for anyone to enjoy.67
Over 20,000 people worldwide would log on to the website daily to read the works he made
available.68 After passage of the CTEA, Eldred’s plans to expand the library came to a halt, as
no new public domain material would be available until 2019.69 Professor Lawrence Lessig of
Harvard University learned of Eldred, and thought he would be a good choice for the plaintiff in
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Adeyanju, supra note 4, citing Orrin Hatch, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn
of the Millennium, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 719, 733-34 (1998).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 293 (2002).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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a case challenging the law.70 Eldred agreed to be a part of the suit, and joined Lessig’s effort to
change the law.71
Eldred and nine other co-plaintiffs, each with services involving works from the public
domain, challenged the CTEA as unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause’s “limited times”
specification and the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment.72 The petitioners argued
that “limited time” in effect when a copyright begins is “the constitutional boundary, a clear line
beyond the power of Congress to extend.”73 Petitioners also argued that the CTEA is a “contentneutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny” for such
regulations.74 These constitutional challenges to the CTEA proved to be unsuccessful in the
three lower courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States.75
The case went through the trial court, the District of Columbia Circuit court, the Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court.76 The trial court held that the “limited times” constitutional
limit is not violated because while the CTEA extended copyright terms from the limits of the
1976 Act, the terms are still limited, rather than perpetual, and “therefore fit within Congress’
discretion.”77 Also, the court held that “there are no First Amendment rights to use the
copyrighted works of others.”78 The circuit court affirmed, as did the appellate court,
emphasizing that nowhere in the constitutional text does it suggest that a copyright term is not
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Id.
Id.
72
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 186-187.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 186.
78
Id.
71
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for a limited time if it may later be extended for another limited time.79 After the lower courts
agreed, the Supreme Court heard the case in 2003, affirming the decision.80
The Eldred majority emphasized the Court’s previous decisions of Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. and Graham v. John Deer Co. of Kansas City that held Congress can
implement the “stated purposes of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best
effectuates the constitutional aim.”81 The Court gave great deference to Congress, emphasizing
that “the wisdom of Congress’ action … is not within our province to second-guess.”82 The
Court seemed to move towards favoring rewarding the copyright owner, and away from their
past belief of primarily promoting the public good, and providing public access to works.83
Further acknowledging Congress’ broad powers in regards to copyright, the Court held that
Congress has a “virtually unlimited power to restrict the flow of new material into the public
domain.”84 Therefore, it was clear that the Court gave strong deference to Congress and that
expanding copyright terms are acceptable, so long as the term does not become perpetual.
However, the Court was unanimous in its belief that CTEA was an acceptable,
constitutional law.85 Justice Stevens dissented; stressing that focusing on the compensation of
authors frustrates the members of the public who wish to make use of a work in the free
market.86 Furthermore, he felt that once a work is created, the need to encourage creation is

79

Id.
Id.
81
Id. at Footnote 3 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Bonito Boats v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)).
82
Id. at 222.
83
David E. Shipley, Congressional Authority over Intellectual Property Policy After Eldred v. Ashcroft: Deference,
Empty Limitations, and Risks to the Public Domain, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1255, 1265 (2007) (citing Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining that copyright law makes compensation to the
author a secondary consideration); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (focused on
the idea that copyright law serves the public good rather than the copyright owner).
84
Id. at 1266, citing Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 25556 (2002).
85
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 241-244 (Dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer).
86
Id. at 226.
80
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diminished.87 Stevens also believed that retroactive application of the CTEA would keep
innumerable works out of the public domain, and that preventing the public domain from
growing does not further the intent of the Copyright Clause.88 He believed that the majority had
gone too far, that the Court had essentially stated that Congress’s actions under the Copyright
Clause are judicially unreviewable.89 Justice Breyer also dissented, believing that the original
grant of a monopoly adequately incentivizes authors to create new work.90 Breyer felt that
extending the term of most copyrights to ninety-five years and many new copyrights to seventy
years after the author’s death was essentially a perpetual grant of copyright, and therefore
unconstitutional.91 He strongly felt that although Congress has broad power in regards to
copyright, there are limits to that power, and that the CTEA over-stepped that boundary.92
Therefore, despite the CTEA passing constitutional muster, not all of the justices appreciated the
sweeping deference granted to Congress.93
The outcome in Eldred gives hope that future fights for the expansion of copyright
protection will be successful. The Court bowed to Congress, permitting them to create copyright
legislation as they saw fit, permitting that legislation is within constitutional boundaries. Eldred
suggests that future term expansion, as long as the expansion is not perpetual, could be
constitutional.
VI. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST COPYRIGHT EXTENSION
Many reasons have been put forth by experts, Congress, the courts, and copyright owners
as to why copyright protection should be expanded or limited. As 2018 draws closer, these
87

Id.
Id. at 240-241.
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Id. at 241.
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Id.
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Id. at 242-243.
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Id.
93
Id. at 241-244.
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arguments will undoubtedly be put forth again, as Congress will be faced with the decision of
whether or not to extend copyright protection again. Both sides of the argument have ample
reasons as to why expanding or limiting copyright protection furthers the goals of copyright law,
but the benefits of expanding protection outweighs any fear of limiting public access, and will
incentivize authors to create new works for years.
The purpose of copyright law is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."94 The preamble of this section, “to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts” illustrates that copyright law is more focused towards benefiting the public
good, rather than compensating authors.95 The second part of the section, “by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries,” illustrates that while copyright law permits the grant of a monopoly to the author
or inventor, it is to be for a limited time.96 By permitting a limited monopoly, the Framers could
ensure that the public would benefit from works entering the public domain after the author’s
“limited” exclusive ownership ceased.97 This language illustrates that creators are to be
rewarded for a limited time, and the public is then to benefit from works entering the public
domain – a benefit for both parties involved.98
In 17 U.S.C. §106, Congress outlined the exclusive rights that copyright owners are
granted.99 Among other rights, copyright owners are permitted to reproduce their work, prepare

94

U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 8.
Id., Adeyanju, supra note 4 (explaining the intention of the Framer’s in creating the Copyright Clause).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
17 U.S.C. §106.
95
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derivative works based upon their copyrighted works, and distribute their copyrighted works.100
These rights ensure that the creator can exclusively reproduce their work, build off their creation,
and distribute their work in the way they choose. The rights granted to copyright owners further
the progress of science and the useful arts, as the Framers intended.101
The goals of copyright law can be attained while still expanding copyright protection. As
times change, the law needs to change accordingly, as has been evidenced by the amendments to
the Copyright Act throughout the years.102 Proponents of extension argue that expanding
protection will further incentivize the creation of works, that works will be grossly underused if
they fall into the public domain, that other works will be overused and exploited upon entering
the public domain, and that the hard work of copyright owners can be tarnished when their work
enters the public domain.103 Proponents also claim that as times change and the life expectancy
of people increase and the longevity of businesses grows as well, that copyright terms need to be
extended.104 Proponents of CTEA believed that protection should benefit the author, and at least
two future generations of the author’s heirs.105 These arguments present valid reasons as to why
copyright terms should be expanded and the expansion of copyright terms for another, longer
limited time, will not violate the constitution.
The most important argument for copyright extension is that in order to continue to
incentivize creation, authors need to be incentivized adequately. Longer copyright terms mean

100

Id., Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of
Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 794 (explaining the main purposes of copyright law).
101
17 U.S.C. §106.
102
See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790 Act), Act of Feb. 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed
1870), Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976), Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541. (Amendments to the Copyright Act).
103
Christopher Buccafusco and Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?:
Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 12-17 (Spring 2013) (putting forth
numerous hypotheses for copyright extension).
104
Gifford, supra note 6, at 394-397.
105
Id. at 389.
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that the author, and his business or heirs, will exclusively enjoy the rewards of his work for a
longer time, thus creating more of an incentive for him to create.106 Since life expectancies are
increasing as time goes on, some argue that copyright should be extended, since the children and
grandchildren of authors will outlive the current terms, and they deserve to reap the benefits of
those who came before them, authors who want their descendants to benefit from their hard
work.107 Besides people living longer, technological advances have naturally extended the
commercial longevity of works.108 Companies can now grow into huge conglomerates that
withstand the test of time for generations. These changes over time mean that works can be
exploited longer, and that they should be.109 Expanding copyright terms will therefore further
incentivize creation, as authors will be reassured that their work will remain protected for a
longer time.
The potential for works to be underused is also a concern for extension proponents.110 If
current copyright owners know that their exclusive right to their work is limited, this can “lead to
inefficiencies because of impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting these
works.”111 The creation of copyrighted works is often expensive.112 The maintenance or
continued production of works can also be extremely costly.113 If terms are not long enough,
creators cannot confidently know that they will be able to exclude others from copying their
ideas, and therefore will refrain from creating in the fear that their investment will not be
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Buccafusco and Heald, supra note 103, at 3.
Adeyanju, supra note 4.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Buccafusco and Heald, supra note 7, at 13.
111
Id., citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471,
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recovered.114 That undoubtedly suppresses creativity in some capacity, therefore harming the
public. Copyright owners are granted the exclusive right to create derivative works from their
creations.115 However, if terms are not extended, creators will not necessarily be incentivized to
create subsequent derivative works based on their creation.116 While companies with long-term
copyrights, such as Disney, have already recouped their investments long ago, they are still
continuously investing in works featuring that copyright, and taking a copyright away
prematurely therefore stifles creativity. Just because a company has profited “enough” from a
copyright is not grounds for releasing it to the public domain. The potential for the underuse of
current copyrights directly undermines the goal of progress, and is a rightful concern for
expansion proponents.
When copyrights fall into the public domain, especially while they are still in active use,
the gross overuse of the copyright is a realistic danger.117 Assuming that the value of creative
works is finite, when a work falls into the public domain, “others will rush to exploit the work’s
value immediately,” which is not always in the best interest of the public.118 Copyright owners
should have the opportunity to exploit their own creations to the extent they chose to before the
copyright is automatically seized by the public domain.119 If authors know that they are creating
works for the benefit of the public domain rather than for the gain of their heirs, they could be
disenchanted from putting in the time and effort to create. By allowing works to fall into the
public domain too soon, the work might not have hit its maximum value yet, despite being in
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existence for a number of years, and the danger of overuse of copyrights by others is very real,
and copyright owners stand to lose the benefits from the works they created.120
Similar to the idea of others overusing copyrights and making them lose value, is the idea
that by allowing copyrighted works to enter the public domain, the copyright can easily become
tarnished.121 Others are free to use the copyright, and can misuse and distort the copyright to
their liking, very possibly tarnishing the original creation.122 This can reduce the value of the
copyright, and ultimately harm social welfare.123 While some works created by others after a
copyright enters the public domain will undoubtedly benefit society, the idea of taking a
copyright that is in current use and tossing it into the public domain seems wrong. Copyright
law seeks to incentivize derivative works by the author who created the work, not by allowing
others to have their way with a work in the public domain, ultimately tarnishing the original
copyright.124 If consumers see a poor derivative work or an inappropriate use of a copyright,
they potentially will be turned off from the original work, which harms the original author and
can harm the public.125
However, the opponents of extension have their own ample arguments.

Opponents

believe that terms do not need to be extended any further in the interest of incentivizing new or
derivative works, and that it is not reasonable to think that a twenty year increase in copyright
terms for works that have already been created can incentivize new work.126 Also, opponents to
term extension argue that the increase in life expectancy argument of proponents is inadequate,
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as current terms provide for a number of protected years after the death of the author, so the
author benefits from exclusive use for the duration of his lifetime.127
Opponents argue that the idea of protecting the work during the author’s lifetime, and the
lifetime of two generations after him is not an intention of copyright law.128 This intent to grant
protection to the author’s heirs has never been expressly stated as a goal.129 While the desire of a
creator to pass on the fruit of his labors is reasonable, it is too far to support a system that seeks
to benefit descendants that the author did not even know.130 Also, the general public will be
better off if the heirs of these hypothetical authors did something productive.131
Along the same lines of not wanting to protect the rights of future descendants, opponents
disagree that terms should be extended as life expectancies are increasing.132 Opponents argue
that since the current term framework provides for protection for seventy years after the author’s
death, so the work will still be protected for a number of years.133 As life expectancies are
increasing, the author will potentially live longer, and thus the term is automatically extended for
that many more years.134 Opponents feel that since there is no right for two generations to
benefit from copyright protection, that increased life expectancy is also not a legitimate reason to
extend copyright protection.135
While proponents of copyright acknowledge that companies are surviving longer and that
technological advances have made works commercially viable for longer periods, opponents
127
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claim that copyright protection is a “bargained agreement between the government and the
creators.

Copyright protection is not an inherent right, but a statutory creation of the

government.”136 Opponents argue that authors know that their work will eventually fall into the
public domain, and that this is a social bargain that exists in our society.137
Opponents also believe that extension is a potential violation of the public trust
doctrine.138 Since the public benefits from works entering the public domain, freezing the public
domain for a certain number of years can constitute a wrongful taking of works that were going
to enter the public domain and benefit the public.139 Opponents believe that this doctrine can be
applied to copyright law and that freezing the public domain is a direct violation of the public
trust doctrine.140
Decreasing the number of works available for use in the public domain comes with its
own dangers, according to opponents of extension. If works are kept out of the public domain,
authors have less material to build upon.141 Also, some companies and creators suffer, since they
have less to choose from that they can use from the public domain, therefore stifling creativity.142
After the passage of CTEA, the public domain remains frozen until 2018, with no new works
entering it.143
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Opponents also are suspicious of the idea that extended terms will necessarily incentivize
authors to create new works.144 Their view is that it is unlikely that an author would be
incentivized to create a copyrightable work merely because twenty or so years of additional
protection is provided.145 Opponents staunchly believe that if the benefit of incentivizing authors
does exist by extending terms, that benefit is easily outweighed by the harm to the public,
especially with fewer additions to the public domain.146
Besides the aforementioned arguments, opponents staunchly believe that copyright term
extension is at the point where it has become unconstitutional.147 The plaintiffs argued this in
Eldred, without success.148 Since the constitution grants a copyright owner a temporary
monopoly, opponents believe that by continuously increasing terms, Congress is permitting a
perpetual copyright term, which is unconstitutional.149 Opponents also argue that extension is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.150 If the public domain is not growing, opponents
argue that this is a limit on free speech, as those authors cannot use the works that potentially
would be entering the public domain.151
In balancing the arguments of both the proponents and the opponents of extension, it is
evident that the benefits of extension outweigh the potential pitfalls – and adhere to the basic
goals of copyright law. As times change, so must our laws, and with longer life expectancies and
commercial viability of works comes the need for longer terms to continue incentivizing
144
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creation. In order to promote the all-important progress of science and the useful arts, authors
and companies need to be adequately incentivized to create, expanding terms for longer, but
limited, times.
Studies have proven that extension has previously increased the amount of new
copyrights, thus incentivizing creation. In 2003, a study proved that the last two major copyright
changes before CTEA, the Copyright Act of 1976 and the 1988 Berne Convention, had
significant effects on copyright registrations.152 The Berne Convention, a treaty that provided
some international protection from copyrights, was associated with approximately a ten percent
increase in registrations.153 Also, the overall increase in copyright registrations after the 1976
Copyright Act, which extended protection to the life of the author plus fifty years, was about
sixteen percent.154 While the conclusion that therefore these extension of copyright terms
increased creativity has been refuted, it seems that any increase in copyrights can be considered
an increase in creativity and beneficial to the public, making more works available. Apparently,
there is only a “thirty-eight percent chance that a law increasing copyright protection will lead to
an increase in the number of new registrations for a single, unknown category of copyrighted
work.”155 However, any chance of an increase in copyrights would benefit the public. It seems
reasonable to predict that the further expansion of terms would increase registration again –
which supports the goal of copyright law to further the progress of the sciences and the useful
arts.156
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Other studies have shown that changes in copyright law have beneficially affected the
public’s valuation of firms that relied on copyright law.157 In a study measuring how changes in
copyright protection changed the market value of firm equity from 1985 to 1998, it was
determined that statutory changes and court decisions had a significant impact on equity
returns.158 Furthermore, the study showed that the “legal changes broadening copyright
protection were associated with increase in firm equity, while legal changes narrowing copyright
protection were associated with decreases in firm equity.”159 Therefore, changes in copyright
law had an effect on the public’s “valuation of firms that relied upon copyright law.”160 This
ultimately benefits the public, by keeping businesses alive, aiding the economy, and making
more works available to the public.
As for opponents arguing that copyright term extension is unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court has directly ruled otherwise.161 In Eldred, the Supreme Court stated that, “[t]he CTEA
reflects judgments of a kind […] we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.”162 The
Court held that Congress “rationally credited protections that longer terms would encourage
copyright holders to invest in […] their works” because of the incentives that copyright term
extension would create.163 Since it has already been determined that an extended, yet limited,
copyright term is constitutional, Congress is confirmed to have the power to do so. Another
extension would not indefinitely extend copyright terms – and that is the only reason that
extension could be destroyed as unconstitutional. Therefore, a longer extension is in the power
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of Congress to decide upon, and the Supreme Court has already held that it will give great
deference to Congress in this arena.164
Yet another study, conducted in 2006, proved that countries that extended the terms of
copyright from the author’s life plus fifty years to the author’s life plus seventy years anytime
between 1991 and 2002, saw a significant increase in movie production.165 This data proved that
a relationship between copyright duration and the production of movies does exist, and that
increasing copyright duration has a positive impact.166 Increased movie production, or the
increased production of anything copyrightable, furthers the goal of copyright, and these studies
show that increased copyright protection is an incentive for creation.167
The fact that life expectancies and the commercial viability of works increases
demonstrates a need for the expansion of copyright, for additional incentive to create. As life
expectancy increases, an author’s children and grandchildren can very easily live past the
duration of copyright protection of the author’s life plus seventy years.168 Also, modern
technology has increased the commercial viability of works. Companies are surviving longer,
some becoming international conglomerates that have no foreseeable demise, and in order to
incentivize these companies to keep creating, they need additional protection. If a company
whose main copyrights have existed for a long time knows their work will soon fall into the
public domain, they would likely be less incentivized to create derivative works or more new
works utilizing that copyright. For example, Disney might begin rethinking their excessive
branding utilizing Mickey Mouse if they stand to lose that copyright in 2018. They could
164
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potentially start utilizing some of their other characters more prominently and stop making new
works featuring Mickey Mouse. Bruce Lehman, the former Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks, explained to Congress, “There is ample evidence that shows that once a work falls
into the public domain it is neither cheaper nor more widely available than most works protected
by copyright.”169 Lehman further explained that quality copies of public domain works are not
widely available because publishers may not want to publish a work that is in the public domain,
fearing that they will not recoup their investment.170 Therefore, not only would the creator suffer
from losing his copyright protection, but this sort of behavior harms the public, who does not get
the benefit of these works. While current protection does supply security for a significant
amount of time, an increase in protection would promote progress even more, and is more in line
with the increase in life expectancy and the commercial viability of works.
The threat of underuse of copyrights supports extension, due to the belief that works
become less available to consumers when they enter the public domain.171 By not extending
rights, some current copyright owners know that protection for their work is limited and they will
be less inclined to invest the money, time, and effort into building upon their copyrights since
they will not necessarily be able to recoup their investment costs.172 This harms the public, as
some works will therefore never be created. This also applies to works that have already been
created.173 Since some works require “costly investments to maintain, produce, and distribute,”
if authors know they cannot recoup their investment, they will not bother to invest at all.174 For
example, while Disney has recouped their initial investment in creating the Mickey Mouse image
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that is copyrighted, they perpetually utilize Mickey Mouse on products and in their theme parks,
which is a continuous cost. If Mickey Mouse fell into the public domain, Disney might stop
utilizing him, thinking they would not be able to recoup expenditures, and Mickey could become
underused, not benefitting anyone. Allowing a work to fall into the public domain can therefore
result in the underuse of works, which not only harms the original author, who could continue to
profit from the work if it remained under copyright, but the public as well.
Besides the hazard of the general underuse of copyrights, comes the risk that copyrighted
works will be underused in a way that limits derivative works.175 Professor Arthur Miller
explains “you have to provide incentives for [producers] to produce the derivatives, the motion
picture, the TV series, the documentary, whatever it may be.”176 This ultimately harms the
public, by preventing progress as a result of derivative works the author could have created.
The tarnishment of copyrights not only affects copyright holders but the public. If a
copyright enters the public domain and anyone can create a work with it, the public can either be
misled into thinking the creation is the legitimate work of the author, and might consume goods
that are not up to the quality level that they expected and the author’s reputation can be damaged.
For example, the well-loved Christmas classic, “It’s a Wonderful Life” fell into the public
domain in the 1980s.177 Television networks played poor-quality versions of the film, and
companies sold the film on VHS tapes, using whatever shoddy-condition version of the film that
they could find.178 Multiple versions of the film existed in “horrid condition,” and the film was
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often altered by local television stations that removed parts and made ample room for
commercials.179 Luckily, the film was removed from the public domain when a company
successfully claimed that it still held the copyright.180 The film was thereafter digitally restored
and played and distributed in the way it should have been, arguably benefitting the public by
being quality entertainment.181 While copyright protection cannot last forever, it is reasonable
that terms should be extended because works that are very much still in use deserve to be
protected from tarnishment, for the sake of not only the authors, but the public as well.
In summary, while the public domain benefits the public by providing works for authors
to build upon and public access to older works, it is also a problem for copyrights that are not
ready to enter the public domain. If terms are extended for a limited time, works will all
inevitably fall into the public domain – but after more time has passed, which better suits modern
times. Exploited and poorly-produced copies can be made which damages the reputation of the
original author, and importantly, misleads the public or presents them with lesser-quality works.
With more years of protection, comes more years that authors know they and their descendants
will benefit from their work, which provides the incentive to create, which undoubtedly always
benefits the public.
VII. HOW COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SHOULD BE EXTENDED IN 2018
As 2018 approaches, Congress will again need to start considering the arguments for and
against term extensions. Congress should recognize that to further incentivize progress and to
reward the creativity behind original works, copyright terms should be extended. The only limit
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on copyright terms is that a term cannot be perpetual.182 The Supreme Court has clearly given
full deference to Congress’ decisions in the past, and as terms have increased, they should
continue to do so to accommodate copyrights.183
By additional term extensions, the intent of the Framers can be furthered, as those with
the talent to create will be incentivized to continue crafting new and innovative works, furthering
progress. By permitting copyright owners to leave their legacy to future generations and
preventing the underuse of useful works by keeping them out of the public domain for longer
periods of time, the future of the progress of the sciences and useful arts can be protected. By
stopping works from entering the public domain too prematurely, where the overuse and
exploitation of the copyright can diminish its value and steal the opportunity of the author to be
compensated maximally, and where copyrights can be tarnished by others, authors will be
incentivized to continue creating, benefiting themselves and the public at large.
If Congress is disenchanted with the idea of granting another twenty-year extension to
copyright terms, and basically replicating CTEA, there are other avenues that Congress could
explore. Since the upkeep of the public domain is a big concern to opponents of copyright term
extension, perhaps the next term extension can make a compromise on how the public domain
will be affected. If some formalities for copyright protection were reintroduced, for example,
requiring copyright owners to apply for and renew their copyrights, works will fall into the
public domain after a certain period of time. Economics scholars William Landes and Richard
Posner agree with this position, offering evidence of low rates of renewal during past periods of
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copyright formalities.184 Landes and Posner assert that less than eleven percent of the copyrights
that were registered between 1883 and 1964 were renewed upon the end of their twenty-eight
year term, despite the low cost of copyright renewal.185 By limiting a copyright term extension
with a way to maintain the growth of the public domain, Congress can potentially appease
opponents somewhat, promote the public good, and continue to protect those who still wish to
retain and use their copyrights.
Many successful companies today still make use of copyrights that have existed for
extended periods of time and are still imperative to their business. As aforementioned, the last
time copyright extension was considered, the value of Disney’s copyright for Mickey Mouse was
a whopping $8 billion in 1998.186 That number has grown, and the company continues to use
Mickey on merchandise, marketing, video productions, and other products. If Disney was to lose
Mickey Mouse in 2018 to the public domain, there would be free reign as to who could produce
merchandise or products using Mickey Mouse. Inferior goods would inevitably be produced,
and consumers might purchase them at a cheaper price, or might purchase them unknowingly,
mistaking the goods to be authentically Disney. This can ultimately result in lost profits for
Disney, and can easily tarnish the quality of entertainment and merchandise for which Disney is
known. A company that is still putting money and work behind a copyright deserves the right to
solely enjoy the benefits of their success.
In order to best further the goals of copyright law, Congress should extend copyright
protection in 2018 once again, and require copyright owners to renew their copyrights, as
aforementioned. A possible solution would be using the current framework, since our copyright
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laws align nicely with those in Europe, and add on additional terms during which copyrights can
be renewed. Therefore, copyrights would start entering the public domain immediately, as some
copyright owners inevitably would choose not to renew. A plan that permits authors to renew
their copyright every five years, for six terms, copyright owners would be given an additional
thirty years of protection. Since a decision of Congress in regards to copyright law must only
pass rational basis review, an extension such as this would survive scrutiny by the court.
Especially if renewable terms were added, thus allowing the public domain to grow every five
years, rather than have it frozen for a block of years, such as it was as a result of CTEA.
VII. CONCLUSION
In 2018, Congress will be faced with the question of extending terms again or
maintaining the current law, allowing copyrights to infiltrate the public domain as of 2019.187
Proponents of extension will argue that terms can be extended, so long as they are not perpetual
and that longer terms further incentivizes progress. Opponents will argue that there is no right
for a copyright to survive multiple generations, that extensions limit the public domain and the
building upon of works, and that extending terms does not necessarily further incentivize
authors. To best protect current copyrights, and incentivize further creation, Congress should
expand copyright terms within the constitutional limits. By creating a system where formalities
are used, and copyright owners have to renew their copyright, for a number of terms, copyright
law would extend terms, while adding to the public domain, and staying within constitutional
boundaries.
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